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Dennis R. Henderson and Victor K. Nyanteng 
Vertical coordination is a concept whose time has almost come. That it has 
almost come is evidenced by the emerging body of literature addressing this 
phenomenon [see Marion, 1976A, for example]. That it has not yet arrived is 
evidenced by a lack of agreement on what is meant by vertical coordination. Some 
define it as the method or the process by which the activities at tangent verti-
cal stages in a production-marketing system are harmonized, orchestrated or 
otherwise coordinated. Others define it as how well such coordination occurs. 
That is, some suggest that vertical coordination is a process; others suggest 
it is the result of a process. 
Mighell and Hoofnagle have perhaps the first word on what is vertical 
coordination. They define it as a process: " ••• all the ways of harmonizing 
the successive vertical steps, or stages, of production and marketing." Viewed 
this way, there is a remarkable conceptual similarity to competitive market 
behavior. The difference: competitive behavior refers to the actions of rivals, 
each seeking to be selected over their rivals by someone on the other side of 
the market [Arthur, 1972]. Vertical coordination refers to the actions or 
activities of dependents -- suppliers and supplyees, sellers and buyers each 
seeking a complimentary or cooperative arrangement with each other. 
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The outcome or the results of the process of vertical coordination can be 
viewed as coordinative performance, much as market performance is the outcome 
of competitive market behavior. Both are roughly synonymous with economic per-
formance as measured by such things as operatlonal efficiency, progressiveness, 
stability, growth, equity and allocative accuracy. 
Both Marion [l976B] and Henderson [l975A, l975B] have suggested that the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organization theory might 
be applicable to studies of vertical coordination. Perhaps, certain structural 
characteristics can be identified which are related to the kinds of coordinatlng 
behavior engaged by persons in tangent vertically arrayed stages in a production-
marketing system, just as market structure is related to competltive behavior. 
Likewise, different performance results might be associated with different coor-
dinating activites. We set out to test the applicabillty of this concept, of 
the idea that industrial organlzation theory can be expanded and modified to 
provide a basic framework within which vertical coordination can be examined as 
to its causes and consequences. Thls paper reports on that effort. 
The Theoretical Model 
Hypothetically, there are a large number of structural variables, types of 
coordinating behavior and dimensions of performance relevant to vertical coor-
dination. Among the structural conditions or variables which have been suggested 
by Marion and by Henderson are the number of enterprises in vertically tangent 
stages, the relative size of enterprises in these stages, the number of parallel 
channels through which vertically tangent stages can interface (such as various 
market channels, contracting opportunities, and so on), the perishability of 
products, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of products, the spatial distribution 
of enterprises at vertically tangent stages, and the frequency of transactions 
between such enterprises. 
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Conceptually, types of coordinating behavior can vary as widely as does 
competitive behavior. In industrial organization theory, competitive actlvities 
are measured in terms of variables such as product strategies, pricing behavior, 
advertising and promotion, research and innovation and legal tactics [Scherer, 
1971], and range on a continuum defined by perfectly competitive behavior at 
one end and perfectly monopolistic behavior at the other. In between are behaviors 
loosely categorized under headings such as monopolistically competitive and 
several categories of oligopolistic. Likewise, coordinating behavior can be 
specified in terms of variables such as type of exchange or inter-stage trans-
action, process of determining terms of exchange, and the extent to which a 
long-term agreement over varlous terms of exchange lS used [Marion, 1976B]. 
Conceptually, just as its possible to array types of competitive behavior 
on a continuum ranging from perfect competition to perfect monopoly, it lS also 
possible to array types of coordinating behavior on a continuum ranging from 
spot market transactions at one extreme to vertlcal integration (common owner-
ship of two or more tangent vertical stages) at the other extreme. Richardson 
has illustrated th~the difference between these extremes is the difference 
between coordination which is securred through conscious direction within flrms 
(vertical integration) and that which is left to the spontaneous working of the 
invisible hand (spot market transaction). In between is an array of transaction 
practices in which interstage coordination is achieved with an increasing amount 
of spontaneity and a decreasing amount of conscious direction. This array 
includes established trading practices, various marketing arrangements such as 
auction markets and private treaties, use of market agents such as commission 
firms, and various types of subcontracting, contracting, and joint ventures. 
Richardson points out that, what is varying along this continuum is the 
extent to which parties operating vertically arrayed enterprises accept obligation 
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and thus provide assurance to each other with respect to their future conduct, 
With spot market transactions there is no advanced commitment. As we move 
along the continuum, the mutual obligation of two vertically-related enterprises 
or trading partners to each other increases until they come under common control 
at the vertical integration extreme. 
Regarding performance measures, it is conceptually possible to include any 
dimension of economic performance in a study of industry structure and behavior. 
Realistically such study is limited to those dimensions which are measurable. 
Marion [19T6B] has suggested that the performance dimensions most likely to be 
affected by various coordinating activities include allocative accuracy (or the 
extent to which the output of one stage of production aligns with the input 
needs of the next stage), stability of output, prices and profits, operational 
efficiency, waste and spoilation, and the e~uity with which risks and returns 
are shared among enterprises at various stages. 
The Research Setting 
Our test of the applicability of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
for studying vertical coordination was combined with an ongoing effort to more 
accurately describe and understand vertical coordination in the cow/calf-feed-
lot segment of the beef subsector. Therefore, our analysis was limited to one 
industry - feeder cattle, and essentially three stages of production: cow/calf 
enterprises, growing enterprises and feedlots. Additionally, as the new use 
of a conceptual model requires uni~ue specification of variables, considerable 
primary data had to be collected. To keep the task manageable and within a 
narrow budget, primary data collection was limited to the state of Ohio. 
Data used in our analysis were collected through a mail questionnaire. 
The ~uestionnaire was designed to gain mirror-image responses from operators of 
cow/calf enterprises as suppliers/sellers, from feeder cattle growers as both 
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buyers and sellers and from feedlot operators as buyers. The m1 rror- 1 mage 
technique allowed paired comparisons among sets of traders with common output-
input relationships. Questionnaires were mailed in October, 1975 to 4500 nanes 
randomly selected from lists of cattle producers maintained by extension agents 
in each of Ohio's 88 counties. By December, 1975, 948 returns were received, 
upon which our analysis is based. 
The Model Tested 
In this study, basic structural variables were limited, either by intent 
or by our ability to collect useable data, to (1) size of enterprises, (2) per-
ceived product perishability, (3) perceived product heterogeneity and (4) spatial 
distribution of vertically-arrayed enterprises. These were measured as follows: 
enterprise size was specified as a continuous variable in terms of the number 
of feeder cattle produced for cow/calf enterprises, the number grazed for growing 
operations and the number placed in feedlots for feeding enterprises. Product 
perishability was treated as a discrete variable based upon perceived shrink and 
death loss of feeder cattle during inter-enterprise transfer. These ranged from 
zero to 12 percent for shrink and from zero to 5 percent for death loss. Per-
ceived heterogeneity was considered a discrete variable based upon whether or 
not respondents indicated a preference for feeder cattle of a specific weight 
and/or quality grade. Spatial distribution was measured based upon the reported 
distance between enterprises with direct output-input connections, for example, 
the distance between a feeder cattle enterprise and a feedlot where those cattle 
were fed. 
We specified coordinating practices in the feeder cattle industry along the 
theoretical continuum, based upon an index value associated with the extent to 
which users of various coordinating practices perceived an advance obligation to 
their trading partner. For a spot transaction, we assigned a value of zero and 
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for vertical integration, a value of 100. Based upon our survey of Onio cat~lemen 
we found six distinct types of coordinating practices: use of (1) weel;:ly 
livestock auctions, (2) special feeder cattle auctions, (3) state-approved gr~ded 
feeder cat~le auctions, (4) order buyers, (5) private treaties, and ((,) vertical 
integration. The first four represent various types of establishea ~raJing 
relationships while private treaties represent various types of subcon~ract_ng and 
contracting situations. 
Unfortunately, we did not have adequate data to partition privea.te trc--~ties 
into more specific categories such as established direct trading re:.at1or>sr.1rs, 
marketing contracts, production contracts and so on which could be rrorf' 11l"t>-
cisely tied to degrees of advance obligation. Contracts are rarely ,wvl in tlus 
industry, thus we did not have as much specific detail on coordinating practices 
in our experiment as would be desirable for thorough testing of thi:::; co:,eE:'ptu"l.l 
model. 
An index value was then calculated for each type of coordina.tinp; ber:1viur 
based upon the percent of respondents using a particular practice wi.u rcpm·ted 
a specific advance commitment to another vertically positioned onten:rinc. The 
resulting values are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Indices of Advance Obligation Associated with Sel~ctod 
Coordinating Practices in the Ohio Feeder Cattle Industry, 
19'75. 
Coordinating Practice 
Weekly Livestock Auction 
Special Feeder Cattle Auction 
Approved Graded Feeder Cattle Auction 
Order Buyers 
Private Treaties 
Vertical Integration 
Source: Nyanteng, p. 171. 
Index 
14.0 
1'7.5 
25.0 
43.0 
52.0 
100.0 
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These index values resulted in the ordering of the coordinating practices 
in the same order that we expected based upon a priori knowledge of these 
practices, thus we felt they were useable. Nonetheless, we have two concerns 
with these values. First, we believed a priori that weekly livestock auctions 
were essentially spot market transactions, that very little if any advance 
obligation exists and therefore should have an index value near zero. Thus, 
the calculated value of 14.0 seems high. Perhaps, the respondents were reflect-
ing advance obligation to the operator of a market rather than to an enterprise 
at another stage of production. Secondly, the wide difference between the values 
for private treaties and for vertical integration, caused by our inability to 
more precisely specify various types of contracting behavior, detracts from the 
detail which is desirable in the upper half of the index range and is regrettable. 
Improved specification is surely possible. 
We attempted to measure performance in terms of efficiency and allocative 
accuracy. Operational efficiency was specified in terms of both coordinating 
(transaction) costs and waste, and allocative accuracy in terms of both quantity 
alignment and quality alignment between enterprises producing and those using 
feeder cattle. We were unsuccessful in gathering consistent and reliable data 
on coordinating costs, thus were limited to a partial measurement of operational 
efficiency in terms of product loss (physiological costs). This was measured 
by cattle death and weight loss during inter-enterprise transfer. We used two 
measures to estimate allocative accuracy: (1) the extent to which operators of 
enterprises using feeder cattle as inputs (growing and feeding) indicated that 
they could not procure an adequate supply of feeder cattle of the type and quality 
desired, and (2) the extent to which quality perceptions of feeder cattle held 
by producers and users were inconsistent with each other. 
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The quality perception measure was based upon Purcell's study where he reported 
"significant d1fferences of opinion between feeder and producer groups as to 
what character1stics give value to a feeder animal" [p. 67]. He used a mirror 
image approach with written and pictorial qual1ty descr1ptions of feeder cattle 
subm1tted to producers and feeders in Oklahoma. We used the same techn1que, 
hypothesiz1ng that there were differences in the deviations between producers 
and users Qual1ty perceptions, depending upon the type of coord1nating behavior 
engaged. That is, we expected to find less disagreement between producers and 
users over what constitutes quality in feeder cattle among those involved in 
private treaties or vertical integration, compared to those who coord1nate through 
spot markets. 
The Results 
A linear regress1on model of the form: 
Y = f(x1 , x2 , x3 , x4) 
was used to analyze the relationship between coordinating behavior and basic 
structural condit1ons, where: 
Y = the index value of the coordinating practice us~d 
xl = enterprise size 
x2 = perceived product perishability 
x3 = perceived product heterogeneity 
X4 = spatial distribut1on of vertically-arrayed enterprises. 
Variables X2, x3 and X4 were specified as dummy variables in the model while 
Y and X1 were included as continuous variables. Step-wise multiple regression 
was used to fit the equation. The results are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Results of Stepwise Linear Regression of 
Vertical Coordination Against Selected 
Measures of Basic Structural Conditions 
Independent Regression Standard 
Varlable Coefficient Deviatlon 
Constant 40.1447 3.9952 
Spatial Distribution 13.7062** 5.6435 
Enterprise Size 0.0115*?: 0.0047 
Perceived Heterogeneity 
Weight Preference 
-6.8472** 3.5910 
Quality Preference 0.6644 2.1689 
Perceived Perishability 
Death Loss -4.2868* 2.9254 
Shrink 3.2761 2.6974 
** Significant at the 95 percent Confidence Level. 
* Significant at the 90 percent Confidence Level. 
Cummulative 
R2 
0.0644 
0.1057 
0.1283 
0.1512 
Both spatial distribution and enterprise size were found to be structural 
variables related to the type of coordinating behavior with a statistical sig-
nificance exceeding the 95 percent level of confidence. Additionally, one partial 
measure of product heterogeneity, weight preference, was also related with a 
confidence exceeding 95 percent while one partial measure of product perishabil-
ity, death loss, was significantly related to coordinating behavior with greater 
than 90 percent confidence. The other measures of perishability and hetero-
geneity, however, were not significant at the 90 percent level. 
Spatial distribution, or the geographical distance between vertically tangent 
enterprises, was the most important explanatory variable examined, and was 
positively correlated with about 6.5 percent of the variation in the index 
values associated with coordinating behavior. That is, as distance between these 
enterprises increases, there is a relatively small but significant increase in 
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the advance coordinative obligation of vertically tangent enterprises to each 
other. Enterprise size was the second most important explanatory variable, 
positively associated with about four percent of the variation in coordinating 
behavior. That is, as enterprise size increases, so does advance obligation. 
Product heterogeneity and perishability were each associated with about 2.3 
percent of the variation in coordinating behavior. In total, just over 15 percent 
of the variability in the index value of coordinating behavior was explained by 
the structural conditions examined. While this represents a statistically sig-
nificant difference from zero correlation at the 95 percent level of confidence, 
the model represents low explanatory power and is clearly underspecified. 
We had notably less success in dealing with performance, largely because 
we did not find much variation across the industry in Ohio in the magnitude of 
the performance parameters measured. Evaluation of operational efficiency was 
limited because of our lack of data on transaction and coordination costs. Addi-
tionally, we found little actual variation in physiological costs, measured in 
terms of shrink and death. For example, in 89 percent of the interstage transfers 
of feeder cattle examined in Ohio, no death loss was reported. In over 90 
percent of such transactions shrinkage was reported to be 5 percent or 1css. 
Thus, there was insufficient variation in this measure of performance to deter-
mine a statistical association between it and coordinating behavior. Nonethe-
less, respondents did report sharply reduced shrinkage, death loss and transac-
tion costs when using contracts as opposed to no contracting in the coordinating 
process. However, we did not have enough observations on contracting to allow 
testing for statistical association. 
Also, we did not find much variation in our measures of allocative accuracy. 
About 90 percent of the feeder cattle users reported no difficulty in procuring 
adequate supplies. And, contrary to Purcell's findings, we found no statisti-
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cally significant differences in the perceptions of producers and users with 
regard to what characteristics give value to feeder cattle~ thus we could not 
correlate such differences with various coordinating practices. There are 
several plausable explanations for the inconsistency of our findings with those 
of Purcell: (l) there are differences between Ohio and Oklahoma cattlemen~ 
(2) there are changes in quality perceptions of feeder cattle by cattlemen over 
time; our findings were based upon a 1975 survey while Purcell's were based 
upon a survey occurring sometime prior to 1973, and/or (3) one or both studies 
contain errors of specification or measurement. While the similarity of technique 
(mirror image opinions of pictorial and written quality descriptions) argues 
against the latter explanation~ differences in sample size (46 in Purcell's 
study~ 948 in ours) may partially offset that argument. 
While little concrete evidence was uncovered concerning interrelationships 
between vertical coordination and performance, this does not mean, per se, that 
such linkages don't exist. Rather~ the lack of significant relationships in 
our study stemmed largely from the small amount of variation discovered in the 
performance measures used. Improved measurements of an expanded array of 
performance dimensions are clearly in order. 
Limitations 
From the outset there were two major limitations to the usefulness of any 
conclusions which could be drawn from this study: first~ the model was tested 
in a single industry rather than in a multiple industry situation. The latter 
should yield greater variability in the parameters and thus reveal greater in-
sights into functional relationships than does an intraindustry analysis. And 
second, any insights gained into the causes and consequences of vertical coor-
dination in the feeder cattle industry are not necessarily extendable beyond 
Ohio. 
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The second point is of minor concern relative to determining the applica-
bility of the structure-conduct-performance model to vertical coordination. The 
first factor is more troublesome: the lack of wide variation in structural 
conditions and coordinating activities within one industry could lead to the 
discovery of no significant relat1onships between these var1ables and performance, 
thus causing premature rejection of the conceptual framework w~en its ~pplica­
tion across industries demonstrating wider variations could be productive. A 
cross-industry study and/or one utilizing data from a larger geographic area 
should reveal greater variation in structure-conduct-performance measures and 
thus allow more complete investigation of potential linkages. 
The low explanatory power of the model regressing coordinat1ne behavior 
against basic structural conditions may be due to any or some combination of 
these factors: (1) incomplete identification of structural var1ables, (2) mis-
specification of structural variables, (3) misspecificat1on of the dependent 
variable, coordinating behavior, (4) misspecification of the f~nctional form, 
or (5) lack of a more powerful relationship between structural conditions and 
coordinating behavior. 
Because we had recognized the potential for misspecificat1on anrl in~omplete 
identification from the outset, due largely to the nature of the case examined, 
we consider the discovery of some significant structure-conduct relationships 
as a positive indication that the conceptual approach is or can be useful in 
aiding our understanding of the causes and consequenc~of various types of 
coordinating behavior. 
Conclusion 
Despite low explanatory power of the causes and consequences of vertical 
coordination generated by the reported use the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm of industrial organization theory, we believe that there is room for 
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cautious optimism as to the potential usefulness of this conceptual approach. 
Our experiment suffered from numerous limitations of both concept and applica-
tion. Conceptually, while there were previous writings detailing structural, 
behavioral and performance dimensions which can be logically argued as related 
to vertical coordination, there exists no previous report of empirical applica-
tion. Thus, both the specification and measurement of such variables was largely 
virgin territory. Clearly, both specification and measurement need further 
development if this concept is to be given a fair test. Furthermore, our results 
may have been limited by the single industry - limited geographic area of the 
case examined. Broader experimentation also seems warranted. 
Nonetheless, we feel some useful results emerged. Size, distance and 
product characteristics appear to be potentially important structural conditions 
affecting vertical coordination. And it appears to be operationally feasible, 
as well as theoretically attractive to view vertical coordination as a process, 
as a group of activities, and to place it on a behavioral continuum much as we 
place competitive behavior on a continuum. Thus, we offer a start. Much further 
development and experimentation will be necessary to determine how it should end. 
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